Scattered immigrants had been arriving since the 1830s and some immigrant colonies in countries like Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Paraguay and Mexico were established during the following decades. However, civil wars in the Southern Cone, slavery in Brazil and Cuba, and the tyranny of distance for Chile and Peru prevented the attraction of a high flow of foreign workers.
Various colonization projects brought European immigrants to some countries in the midnineteenth century, but most plans failed miserably. 3 The German colonies were the most successful in southern Brazil and Chile and the Welsh in Patagonia. Italians contributed to successful colonies in Argentina and Brazil and in this early period, Portuguese immigration to Brazil was also significant. However, only a few countries in Latin America managed to attract massive European immigration from 1870 onwards. More than 90 percent of the European emigrants who travelled to the region between 1870 and 1930 chose Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, or Cuba. 4 From the mid-nineteenth century until 1930 approximately four million Europeans settled in Argentina, some two million in Brazil, and slightly fewer than 600,000 in Cuba and
Uruguay (Sánchez-Albornoz 1974, p. 129) .
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European sources of emigration changed over time. An "emigration life cycle" related to demographic transition, industrialization, and the "pull" of growing stocks of migrants abroad has been well documented (Hatton and Williamson 1998, chap. 3) . Emigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe account for most of the surge in numbers from the 1880s, but Italians and
Portuguese were relatively early migrants in Latin America. Emigrants from Eastern Europe began to arrive in the late 1890s, while those from the former Ottoman Empire did so during the 1920s. For the whole region, there was a high concentration of immigrants in the decades prior to the First World War. More than half a million Spanish immigrants disembarked in Buenos Aires in 1910-13, surpassing those who had arrived in Spanish America during more than three centuries of colonial rule. 5 The era of mass immigration was short-lived; after 1914, the rate of immigration fell, and the Great Depression signalled the end of mass migration to Latin America. 6 Immigration composition by nationality remained stable over time. 1 8 8 8 1 8 9 0 1 8 9 2 1 8 9 4 1 8 9 6 1 8 9 8 1 9 0 0 1 9 0 2 1 9 0 4 1 9 0 6 1 9 0 8 1 9 1 0 1 9 1 2 1 9 1 4 1 9 1 6 1 9 1 8 1 9 2 0 1 9 2 2 1 9 2 4 1 9 2 6 1 9 2 8 1 9 3 0
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Return migration was high but not substantially different from the same nationalities returning from the United States. Recently, Bandiera, Rasul, and Viarengo (2013) , estimated that 60-75 percent of migrants returned to Europe from the United States in the 1900s and 1910s.
These figures are over twice as high as official estimates. Italians showing the highest repatriation rate, followed by Spaniards, Portuguese and Japanese. Yañez (1994, pp. 135-37) Return migration may have been planned as part of an optimal life-cycle residential location sequence: target income immigrants migrate for a few years, accumulate financial resources, and then return to the source country. If immigrants planned to return after reaching a target savings, success in the host labour market implied returning home.
Therefore, conceptually, return migrants could be positively selected if more productive migrants reached their target savings faster than others.
Transiency was a common feature of Italian emigration to the New World. Scholars argue that return migration to Italy was a planned strategy before emigration. More than 75%
of Italians applying for a passport after 1901 declared their intention to return regardless of their destination (Cinel 1982, pp. 47-49) . As the return rates from the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina were similarly high, it seems unlikely that Italians were unsuccessful in all destinations.
Alternatively, migrants may have returned at particular times due to unexpected changes in the economic situation of the destination country. The high return rate of migrants of all nationalities from Argentina after the 1890 Baring crisis was an immediate reaction to the steep decline in workers' living standards and the distress in the urban labour market. This crisis could have pushed out many target income immigrants earlier. Or, alternatively, immigrants may have remained to compensate for lower wages in the host country simply by staying longer (Dustmann 2001 ).
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A third possibility for return migration is because immigrants failed to adapt to the host country. Negative selection occurs when unsuccessful migrants return home (Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson 2014) . This seems to be the case for high out-migration from Argentina in the early 1890s because of the Baring crisis. Since immigration had been subsidized in the preceding years, Argentine immigration officials estimated that two-thirds of the subsidized immigrants who arrived in the three-year period of such a policy were negatively selected because of lack of skills (República Argentina, 1891, p. 55) . It is possible that a share of immigrants leaving Argentina after the Baring crisis had been negatively selected by subsidized passages and failed to adapt. Subsidies, particularly in Brazil, could have contributed to negative selection of immigrants since subsidies allowed them to overcome poverty constraints at home.
Assuming that immigrants returned to Europe may be misleading. Many immigrants did not return home but moved frequently between Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil. Yañez (1994, tab. 17) estimates that 26 percent of Spaniards leaving Argentina in the years 1894-96 moved to Brazil. Re-emigration from São Paulo to Argentina when the coffee contract ended was also frequent. For example, as Holloway (1980, p. 95) shows, the extraordinary 1906 coffee crop in São Paulo meant a substantial increase in the harvest portion of their income for workers and many then decided to leave Brazil and moved to Argentina.
With the available evidence we can only speculate about positive or negative selection in return migrations because there are no relevant data on the characteristics of returned migrants. For Italian migration there is a consensus that return migration was not the result of failure since it was part of a lifetime strategy for improving living standards at home. Nothing conclusive can be said about returns to Spain or Portugal. Both communities show the lowest return rate from Argentina and Brazil respectively, but evidence is fragmentary about positive or negative selection of return migration.
Latin America entered the age of mass migration late in the nineteenth century. The migratory boom was concentrated in 1900-1914 with a modest revival in 1920 (except in Cuba). Immigrants came overwhelmingly from Southern Europe and re-emigration and return migration was high.
II
A potential European emigrant could choose between alternative destinations in America in the late nineteenth century. Attempts to explain the choice between competing destinations in migration equations have not been very successful. For Italy, Hatton and Williamson (1998, tab. 6.9) found that the choice between Latin America and the United States was mainly driven by the stock of previous emigrants, a finding confirmed by Gomellini and O'Grada (2011) . Balderas and Greenwood (2010) find little evidence of substitution between Argentina and Brazil for 12 European countries; a surprising result since immigrants moved frequently between the two countries.
To explain the selection of destination, the literature has considered, among other variables, language and cultural affinity. The transoceanic migrations from Europe sought to minimize the loss of language capital, with migrants to South America more likely to come from Romance language countries, while those from the British Isles favoured North America (Chiswick and Hatton 2013) . It is often suggested that colonial ties, a common language, and cultural affinity meant that different destinations were poor substitutes, a feature reinforced by the friends and relatives effect (Taylor 1994 Sources: Williamson (1998) and . Notes: Each Latin American country real wage relative to the average of Italian, Portuguese and Spanish real wages (weighted by its population in 1913).
The Todaro (1969) model explains that migration decision is based on future expected income at home and abroad rather than just wage differentials. Immigrants to São Paulo valued the prospective savings as a crucial part of the expected income, the guaranteed job on arrival, and the subsidized transportation cost.
11 Going to Brazil was perceived in Southern Europe as a good investment.
12
There are two relevant factors in explaining the choice of Brazil as destination and how Brazil competed for foreign workers: transport subsidies and colono contracts in the coffee areas.
11 Similarly, Pope, (1976) , stressed that most British emigrants went to Australia because of enhanced employment prospects, not because of better wages. 12 Newspapers and immigrants' letters stressed the miserable conditions of working in the plantations, but Italians kept travelling even after the ban on subsidized immigration (1902 ( ). Franzina, (1979 Subsidized immigration helped potential emigrants in Europe to overcome the problems involved in funding long-distance migration. This is important when emigration was income constrained as it was in Southern Europe. Poverty and information constraints explain why emigration was so low from some Spanish provinces despite large wage differentials with the New World (Sánchez-Alonso 2000)
. 13 It is difficult to estimate the impact of transport subsidies on potential emigrants. It is difficult to estimate the impact of transport subsidies on potential emigrants. In 1905-13, the cost of the trip to Latin America for an agricultural worker from
Northern Spain represented 32 per cent of his yearly income, slightly more than for than for a
Northern Italian worker (28 per cent). 14 Over time, remittances and pre-paid tickets helped to finance the moves of relatives and friends and non-subsidized immigration increased significantly.
The colono contracts to subsidized immigrants in the coffee plantations of Southeast
Brazil are the second reason why Brazil was attractive for Southern European emigrants. The contracts established three separate sources of money wages: (1) payment for the care of coffee trees during the annual production cycle (depending on the numbers of trees per family, which in turn depended on the number of working people in the family). This accounted for roughly one-half to two-thirds of the colono family income; (2) payment for the coffee harvest when labour was contracted as a family unit. Harvest income fluctuated considerably from year to year because of wide variations in yields per tree, being higher in the frontier areas because of higher yield per tree; and (3) payment for occasional day labour on the plantation (Holloway 1980, pp. 74-81) .
The colono contract also included two non-monetary income sources: free housing and plantation land between coffee trees to grow their own food and/or pasture land for livestock.
13 Faini and Venturini (1994) 
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Available colono family budgets presented by Holloway (1980, pp. 80-85) and Vangelista (1982) suggest that the household obtained large shares of its income (in some cases over 50 percent) from cash crops and animal products. Hence, the advantages that the colono contract offered to immigrants are not captured by real wages. Contracts also guaranteed employment after landing, reducing uncertainty and search costs. It seems that the wage gap is not the relevant variable in explaining the attraction of Brazilian coffee plantations for immigrants. 15 Migrants were attracted by a combination of subsidies and potential savings; going to Brazil was perceived in Southern Europe as a good investment.
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Scholars have discussed whether the labour supply from Southern Europe to Latin
America was more elastic than from the rest of Europe to other destinations. The Lewis model of unlimited supply of labour has been a cornerstone in development economics. Before wages begin to rise above the subsistence level (as in Brazil after the abolition of slavery), any country could look for the surplus labour in other countries (Lewis 1954 
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Australia had an assisted migration program. Though the Brazilian subsidies policy was not the same as the Australian assisted scheme, both governments took an active role in attracting and selecting immigrants.
24 Pope (1987) argued that in the absence of an assisted passage scheme a significant proportion of migrants to Australia would not have been able to travel. A similar argument can be applied to Brazil with low wages and hard working conditions on the coffee plantations. The differences between the two policies are significant, however.
Contrary to what happened in Brazil, assisted immigration became highly unpopular in Australia after the 1890s crisis, which led to high levels of unemployment. The explicit goal of Brazilian immigration policy was to maintain the supply of labour constant, so wages were kept low.
Meanwhile, in Australia, the general goal of expanding the labour supply was subject to the constraint that living standards were maintained. While in Brazil immigrants were effectively selected to work the land, in Australia the nomination system was geared to introduce those "classes, and those alone who can readily assimilate in the industrial life". 25 Immigrants who could pay their own passage to Brazil were partially considered non-desirables because they were supposed to enter non-agricultural occupation "thus bringing in consumers instead of elements of production".
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Brazilian policy was not intended to populate the country, as in Argentina, but specifically aimed at sustaining the production of coffee. With the cessation of slave arrivals and the final abolition of slavery, subsidizing European immigration appeared to be the best solution to maintain a constant labour supply. 27 From 1888 to the 1930s more than 2 million immigrants arrived and around 58 percent of them were subsidized by the state of São Paulo (Vangelista 1982; Holloway 1980 Why did the system last so long? The coffee plantation was not able to generate a stable labour force. As the land of the old plantations became less fertile, planters moved to virgin lands in the frontier where they needed more workers. Simultaneously, older colonos, able to accumulate enough savings to buy land, established themselves as suppliers of food to the São Paulo urban market. At least one-quarter of the labour force needed to be replaced every year as thousands of colonos left the plantation to till their own plots, migrated to the cities or abandoned Brazil (Font 1987) . The colonato system could only survive with a continuous flow of subsidized immigration.
Brazil had a relatively large native population. Native-born Brazilians, particularly in the Northeast, might have benefited from the labour demand in the Southeast and internal migrants could have supplied workers for the plantations. It seems unlikely that the transportation cost of bringing workers from one region to the other exceeded the cost of transporting thousands of workers from Europe to Brazil. Leff (1982) hypothesized that in the absence of subsidized overseas immigration, most of the Southeast labour supply would have come first from the region's domestic agricultural sector and over time from the Northeast. However, former slaves refused to work in the plantations and Merrick and Graham (1979, pp. 85-90) argued that it was not so obvious that a substantial labour surplus existed in the Northeast, at least in the years after abolition. Given the rapid expansion in the coffee areas, an interregional labour transfer of such magnitude would have caused serious economic and political stress between the North and the South. The large distances within Brazil meant high transportation costs. Passenger railway services improved the efficiency of Brazilian labour markets by making labourers more geographically mobile. However, given the low levels of income, for many Brazilians even the train proved too expensive (Summerhill 2003, pp. 110-17) . As in the United States, the First World War provided the definitive push to internal migration. Due to the shortage of overseas immigrants, the flow of workers from other parts of Brazil to the coffee areas started during the war and grew relative to overseas inflows in the 1920s. In the short run, it seems that paying subsidies to European workers was the only -and most rational-option.
We could hypothesize whether, without a large supply of European immigrants available for the coffee plantations, Brazilian natives would have been better off. Leff (1973) Selection could occur along a number of observable characteristics such as education, skills or wealth and other unobservable characteristics such as youth, energy and ambition.
According to Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson (2012) , migration to the United States was positively selected from some European countries (Germany and Great Britain) and negatively selected from others (Ireland and Italy). The same authors argued that the switch of emigrant sources from high-wage to low-wage European countries correlates with a decrease in the quality of immigrants (Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson 2014 Klein (1983 and 1991) . 32 There is a sharp contrast between Spaniards from the Peninsula and Canary islanders. The latter display the lowest literacy and numeracy rates of Spain and those who left were the least skilled. Juiff (2015).
inadequate. In the three main European countries of origin, the Northern regions, from where most immigrants were drawn, tended to be more literate than the South, particularly in the Immigrants to Latin America had higher literacy levels than native populations (Rocha, Ferrraz, and Soares 2017) . In 1895, 38 percent of foreigners living in Argentina were illiterate compared to 61 percent of natives. In Brazil and Cuba, the native populations, largely composed of black and mestizo groups, were less skilled than European workers. In Brazil immigrants´ skills and literacy levels were above those of native workers. Only 34 percent of immigrants older than 7 who arrived in São Paulo between 1908 and 1936 were illiterate compared with 73 percent of native-born illiterates in the state in 1920 (Klein 1996) .
European emigrants were successful in the adjustment to labour markets in Latin America probably because of migrant selectivity. Latin American countries also offered greater possibilities for social mobility than the United States. This is particularly true in the case of 33 Portugal is not considered in their sample.
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Italians (Baily 1999; Klein 1983) . Germani (1963) was among the first scholars to point out the extraordinary upward mobility for immigrants in Argentina from the first generation. 34 Moya (1998) highlights the greater opportunities for newcomers to Buenos Aires when compared with more developed and industrial cities in North America. When mass migration from Southern Europe started, cities in the United States had larger, older, more powerful, and better-established sectors dominated by natives and older immigrants. In contrast, European immigrants were particularly successful in becoming owners of industries or commercial enterprises in Latin American cities.
Immigrants were successful in moving rapidly to a prominent position in Brazil's socioeconomic structure. Colonos had access to land where they could produce for their own subsistence and eventually for the market. This source of cash income enabled savings and social mobility (Font 1987 and . 35 Italian owners of rural property in the richest areas of São Paulo represented 14.3 percent compared to 3.6 percent of Portuguese (Holloway 1980, tab. 7) . In Brazil, Spaniards did reasonably well in access to property in agriculture, despite the disadvantages in relation to education. They did not do so well in business, commerce and industry compared with Italians and Portuguese (Klein 1996) . Spaniards enjoyed a privileged position in Cuba even after Independence; the probability of joining the ranks of white-collar workers was higher than in any other country.
In Argentina, Italian-born immigrants did extremely well in landownership. According to the 1914 population census, 25 percent of Italians aged 20 and over owned some type of property, a figure only slightly below native-born Argentine. In contrast, only 16 percent of Spanish immigrants owned property in 1914. Many Portuguese in Brazilian cities became school teachers, clerks and other semi-skilled professions but, again, the literature presents 34 More recently, Miguez (1993) . 35 See also Vidal Luna, Klein, and Summerhill (2016) for the emergence of an alternative agrarian economy of small and medium producers in Sao Paulo 28 the Italians as the most successful group in access to property. The high rate of ownership for Italians, considered the archetype of temporal migrants, is striking.
Recent research proves empirically that it was the possibility of rapid social upgrading that made Argentina attractive for immigrants. Linking data for males across 1869 and 1895 census dates, Perez (2017) shows that first-generation immigrants experienced faster occupational upgrading than natives. 36 These results contrast with recent evidence presented by Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson (2014) for the Unites States where immigrants appear to have experienced similar rates of occupational upgrading to natives. Using passenger lists, Perez (2017) followed immigrants in Argentina from their arrival to the 1895 census.
Occupational upgrading occurred for a large proportion of those who declared unskilled occupations on arrival; less than 25 percent of those who entered between 1882 and 1894 as unskilled workers were still in those occupations in 1895. Ferrie (1997) finds that about half of the immigrants arriving to the United States in the 1840-1850 period were still working as unskilled workers in 1860 (even excluding the Irish). Although Perez fails to explain why Argentina was a good place for immigrants' social upgrading, his findings provide an economic rationale of why some Europeans chose Argentina as a destination over the United States. An analysis of a sample of marriage records combining data on occupation, property ownership, and literacy supports similar conclusions for Uruguay and immigrants are associated with the rise of a strong middle class (Goebel 2010 ).
In the United States, the traditional picture was that of immigrants who initially held lower-paid occupations than natives and converged over time. Recently, Abramitzky et al. (2014) showed that the average immigrant did not face a substantial occupation-based earnings penalty upon arrival and experienced occupational advancement at the same rate as natives.
Long-term immigrants from sending countries with real wages above the European median held 36 Also, children of European immigrants displayed substantially better economic outcomes than those of the natives in literacy, occupations and ownership.
29 significantly higher-paid occupations than natives upon arrival, while immigrants from sending countries with below-median wages started out in equal or lower-paid occupations. There is also persistence over time in earning gaps.
Argentine 38 This is a cross-section comparison for 1895. 39 Earnings were assigned to different occupations using Patroni (1897) . Patroni provides information on urban occupations, wages and number of working days more detailed than Buchanan (1898) used by Cortes Conde (1979) and Pérez (2017) . 40 Arroyo Abad and Sánchez-Alonso, (2018, tab. 8) If Spanish immigrants had the advantage of the language and higher literacy rates, why
were Italians more successful in access to property and earnings? Italians had the first-mover advantage. In contrast with the United States, the Italians in Argentina were the first massive group of immigrants to arrive (Devoto, 2006) . 41 Early arrival and not having to compete with older, established immigrants mattered. The higher levels of affluence and prosperity of Italians in Buenos Aires were not based on superior earnings or skills but on older and denser networks.
In contrast, Spanish immigrants had two important disadvantages: later arrival and a demographic structure with a growing number of families over time and higher rates of dependency. Consequently, a lower savings capacity proved to be an obstacle for higher social 41 In the 1880s the proportion of Italian arrivals to Argentina compared with Spaniards was 14 to 1. 31 mobility in the Spanish case. 42 Emigration of Spanish families to Argentina shows an inverse trend compared with Italians. In 1895, more than half of Italians arrived in family groups, while this was the case for only 17 percent of the Spanish flow (Table 3 ). The average size of Spanish families was 2.3 compared with 3.4 members of Italian families. In 1913 the situation had reversed; more than 40 percent of the Spaniards arrived in family groups, a higher proportion than the Italians and of total immigration. It could be the case that the advantages that the Spaniards had in Argentina thanks to a common language, higher literacy rates, and cultural affinity, were counterbalanced by family immigration and a higher dependency rate than the Italians. The prevalent view is that Brazil attracted the poorest of the poor and the more ignorant As in Brazil, recent research has focused on long-run consequences of European immigration in Argentina. Droller (2017) shows that counties with historically higher shares of European immigrants had higher per capita GDP and a greater proportion of skilled workers in
2001. This long-run effect is linked to the higher level of human capital of immigrants and to the fact that Europeans also brought skilled-labour for industry.
Finally, we could speculate about whether immigrants add special skills or entrepreneurial capacities to the local labour force. European immigrants in Latin America seem to have been over-represented among proprietors of industrial and commercial firms.
Immigrants accounted for disproportionately large shares of the workers in São Paulo and Buenos Aires manufacturing industries. Germani (1955) stressed the exceptional contribution of immigrants and their children to the development of an entrepreneurial class in Argentina. Dean 35 (1969) argued that immigrants and their children played an important role as entrepreneurs in the industrialization of São Paulo and for the modernization of the rural sector. 45 Leff (1997, pp. 58-60) argued that immigration was not a sufficient condition to promote development in Brazil.
Without important economic changes, such as the emergence of an internal labour market and the expansion of railways, industrial development would never have kicked off. These changes did not depend on the arrival of European immigrants. If overseas immigrants had not been available, the supply of labour for the growing demand of industrial workers in São Paulo could have come from domestic sources. However, Pereira's inquiry into the ethnic origins of the founders of industrial establishments in São Paulo revealed that first and second-generation
Italians constituted the largest single ethnic group, even in comparison to those whose grandfathers were natives (Pereira 1974, pp. 70-75) .
Generally speaking, new research presents evidence of path-dependency linking past immigrants' human capital and present outcomes in economic development without fully explaining the mechanism of persistence. The impact of immigration in those areas with higher
shares of Europeans appears to be important since immigrants demanded and created schools (public or private). Research has focused on Brazilian colonies but additional research in Argentina, where immigrants were more homogeneous in literacy levels, would improve our understanding of the immigration impact in the long run. European immigrants in Latin America also had a positive impact on economic growth in the short run (as entrepreneurs and industrial labour force).
VI.
Much has been written on the international mass migration of Europeans and some efforts have been made to balance the traditional Anglo-Saxon bias in migration history. This survey has focused on immigrants to Latin America: whether they were positively or negatively selected, their social and economic assimilation to destination labour markets, and the impact 45 Also, Merrick and Graham (1979) Immigrants came from the economically backward areas of Southern and Eastern
Europe. Yet, migrants to Latin America were positively selected from their countries of origin according to literacy. This is particularly the case of Southern European countries, but more research is needed on other migration flows such as Eastern Europeans or Japanese in Brazil.
Literacy rates, and probably skills, were higher among immigrants compared with the population of origin. Despite non-selective immigration policies, Latin American countries received immigrants with higher levels of human capital than native populations. Immigrants' adjustment to host labour markets seems to have been successful, particularly in access to property and in the large share of owners in industry and commerce. Italians' success in Argentina in relation to that of Spaniards suggests that other factors may have played a role:
an early arrival, the large size of the community, their ability to create efficient occupational and social networks, and possibly a favorable demographic profile in the immigration flow.
However, almost all European communities experienced a strong and fast upward social mobility in the destination countries. Whether this was because of positive selection at home or because of the relatively low skill levels in the host societies is still an open question.
We cannot conclude about positive or negative selection of returned migrants. For
Italians, as in other New World countries, a consensus exists that return migration was a 
